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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the course of a lifetime, we have conversations in a variety of different 
contexts and circumstances, and often successfully communicate despite potential 
challenges these situations might impose on conversation. Here we focus on the challenge 
of communicating with an inattentive conversational partner. In a situation where 
information must be communicated to a partner, how do speakers achieve successful 
communication when that partner is inattentive? 
 According to a prominent view, the common ground held between conversational 
partners – the knowledge and beliefs that they mutually hold – forms the basic context for 
language use (Clark, 1996). Representations of what is and what is not common ground are 
critical to basic processes such as asking an informational question (i.e., asking about 
something not in common ground; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008), or 
describing one of several mutually visible items to a co-present listener (Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986). A classic finding is that when conversational partners repeatedly discuss 
entities that lack an established name (e.g., an abstract image), over the course of the 
conversation they form brief, efficient labels for these items, reflecting the formation of 
common ground (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964; 1966; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
Critically, these brief labels reflect common ground held with that particular 
conversational partner. In studies where a speaker develops brief labels for a series of   
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abstract images with one partner, and then switches to a new partner who has no 
experience with the labels, speakers tend to revert to long descriptions (Wilkes-Gibbs, & 
Clark, 1992; Holler & Wilkin, 2009; Horton & Spieler, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2002; 
2005; also see Brennan & Clark, 1996; Galati & Brennan; 2010). Similarly, in 
conversations among three parties, where a speaker must alternate between addressing one 
partner who is knowledgeable about image labels, and a second partner who is naïve, 
speakers successfully produce brief labels for the knowledgeable partner, and longer 
descriptions for the naïve partner (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014; submitted). These 
longer descriptions are necessary in order for the naïve partner to successfully understand 
the speaker; indeed, overhearers have a difficult time understanding these brief labels once 
they have been established (Schober & Clark, 1989; Kraut, Lewis, & Swezey, 1982; also 
see Fussell & Krauss, 1989). 
 This process of tailoring what is said based on what a specific listener does and 
does not know is known as audience design (Clark & Murphy, 1982; Fussell & Krauss, 
1989), and is thought to require access to representations of common ground that are bound 
in memory to specific conversational partners (Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015; 
Horton & Gerrig, 2005). For audience design to be successful, speakers must make 
accurate inferences about what their communication partner does and does not know. What 
sources of information then, do speakers use to infer what addressees do and do not know? 
Clark and Marshall (1978; 1981) propose that conversational partners use simple heuristics 
to make inferences about what is and is not common ground based on evidence in the 
communicative context. For example, imagine a speaker were to label a picture of a 
drooling monster for an addressee, “This one is called Banpar”. According to Clark and 
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Marshall’s theory, the speaker could assume that the monster, and the label that goes with 
it, are common ground if the addressee is present, attending to what is said, and rational 
(the simultaneity, attention, and rationality assumptions, respectively). 
 Findings that speakers do not assume common ground with listeners who are not 
actively involved in a conversation -- such as bystanders or side participants (Wilkes-Gibbs 
& Clark, 1992) support the hypothesis that simultaneously experiencing an event 
contributes to inferences about common ground. Similarly, when the speaker and addressee 
cannot freely interact, and the speaker lacks full access to the addressee’s feedback, 
communication suffers (Clark & Krych, 2004), indicating that feedback may play an 
important role in formation of common ground (Clark & Bangerter, 2004; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Roque & Traum, 2008; cf. Brown-Schmidt, 2012). Whether the attentiveness 
of a co-present conversational partner guides inferences about common ground is less 
clear. Matarazzo, et al. (1964) find that in a clinical employment interview setting, civil 
service applicants use longer conversational turns when the interviewer nods throughout 
the conversation. Studies of narrative production also suggest that under some 
circumstances, speakers address attentive and inattentive listeners differently. For example, 
Kuhlen and Brennan (2010) asked speakers to tell jokes to a listener, and measured the 
amount of extra detail they added to their delivery of the joke. Speakers were either told to 
expect an attentive addressee, or a distracted addressee; whether the addressee was in fact 
attentive or distracted was independently manipulated. Kuhlen and Brennan found that 
jokes were told with about the same amount of detail across these situations except for the 
case where speakers expected, and experienced, an attentive addressee – in this case, they 
added more detail to their jokes. Similarly, Pasupathi, Stallworth, and Murdoch (1998) find 
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that speakers elaborate spoken narratives more for attentive than inattentive addressees 
(also see Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000; Kraut, et al. 1982). These findings suggest that 
speakers can detect inattention on the part of an addressee, and that inattention can, in turn, 
affect some aspects of language production.  
What these findings do not address, however, is whether the attentiveness of a 
partner modulates assumptions about common ground as hypothesized by Clark and 
Marshall (1978; 1981). While we know of no evidence that speaks directly to this 
hypothesis, related work examining common ground-based processes in language 
comprehension points to a rather limited role for addressee feedback. Using measures of 
on-line language comprehension, Brown-Schmidt (2009) found that when a partner 
explicitly denied hearing what was said, e.g., “Sorry I didn’t hear you” that what had 
previously been said was not assumed to be common ground. However, subsequent 
research manipulating different types of listener feedback hypothesized to provide different 
amounts of evidence for common ground (e.g., repeating back what was said, vs. “OK”, vs. 
silence) found little to no effects (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt & Fraundorf, 
2015; cf. Clark & Schaefer, 1989). Taken together, these findings suggest that so long as 
the addressee does not flat-out deny hearing what was said, that simply being co-present in 
a situation may be sufficient to license an assumption that what was said is common 
ground. On the other hand, findings that narrative production is influenced by addressee 
attentiveness (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010; Pasupathi, et al., 1998; Bavelas, et al., 2000) 
suggest that speakers are sensitive to the addressee’s behavior in the moment. Whether this 
influences inferences about addressee knowledge (and thus what is assumed to be common 
ground between the conversational partners), remains an open question. Another 
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unanswered question concerns the specificity of this influence: if an addressee exhibits 
signs of distraction at one point in the conversation, do speakers assume that they missed 
what was said during the period of distraction alone, or is the effect of distraction more 
general, leading speakers to infer that the addressee may have missed other information in 
the conversation as well?   
Here we test the hypothesis that in conversational situations, speakers only assume 
common ground for what they have said when the co-present addressee exhibits 
attentiveness in the conversational situation. A relevant real-world example is as follows: 
Imagine I am talking to a friend about my favorite character in the new TV show I’m 
watching. If she is listening intently, I can feel secure in the knowledge that she knows the 
character’s name, however, if she pulls out her phone as I am speaking, I am left unsure of 
how much she actually heard, and thus I may be less likely to assume her familiarity with 
the character’s name in later conversation. Across three experiments, the present research 
explores the role of partner attentiveness in formation of conversational common ground, 
and the specificity of this relationship. We examine situations in which conversational 
partners learn the names of a series of cartoon monster pictures together – a paradigm that 
is known to elicit formation of common ground for the names (Gorman, et al., 2013; also 
see Heller, et al., 2012). Manipulations of addressee attentiveness before or during the 
name-learning task are used to evaluate the role of attentiveness in formation of common 
ground, and the specificity of this relationship. Based on well-established findings that 
speakers use longer descriptions of images when addressing a naïve partner who lacks 
common ground for the image names (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; 
Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014; Horton & Gerrig, 2005), we use referential description 
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length as a tool to evaluate whether speakers take into account addressee attentiveness 
when gauging whether common ground has been formed, or not.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In Experiment 1 we examine situations in which speakers interact with two 
conversational partners, one of whom displays signs of inattention early in the 
conversation. We ask whether this lack of engagement has non-specific (general) effects on 
assumptions about common ground for information that is presented later in the 
conversation.  
2.1 Methods 
 
Participants  
30 pairs (N = 60) of native English speaking undergraduates from the University of 
Illinois Urbana-Champaign served as participants in exchange for partial course credit. An 
additional 7 pairs (N = 14) were run and excluded from analysis for scoring below the 
accuracy threshold (5) and experimenter error (2); see details below.  
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(a)  (b) 
Figures 1a-b.  Example stimuli from the map task for the speaker (1a) and listener (1b), 
from Anderson et al. (1991). Note that, by design, the maps contain discrepancies.  
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the experiment in pairs. At the beginning of the study, the 
pair of participants were introduced to each other and were told that a lab assistant would 
also be participating. The participating lab assistant was introduced as never having done 
the task before and currently participating so as to be trained on the task in order to run 
other participants in the future. This cover story was never questioned by any of the true 
participants. An overseeing experimenter observed all trials of all the tasks. One of the true 
participants was randomly selected to be the speaker, and the other true participant and the 
participating lab assistant played the role of matchers. 
There were three phases to the task. In the first phase of the task, the speaker and 
the two matchers were seated in a room together and each was given a paper copy of a 
map. They were seated so that they could not see each other’s maps. The speaker and the 
two matchers completed a version of the Map Task (Brown, Anderson, Yule, and 
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Shillcock, 1983). The speaker’s map had a path drawn between landmarks (Figure 1a), 
whereas the two matchers each had a copy of a similar map that did not contain the path 
(Figure 1b). The presence and names of landmarks on the maps were not identical and 
participants were not informed of this ahead of time, which increases the difficulty of the 
task. The speaker was instructed to describe the path to the matchers so that they could 
draw the same path on their map. Matchers were instructed to pay attention and to ask 
questions if needed. The matchers could see each other’s maps but were not explicitly 
informed their maps were identical.  
The lab assistant matcher behavior during the map task was manipulated in a 
between-subjects manner. In the Engaged condition, the lab assistant matcher participated 
fully and was engaged. In the Disengaged condition, the lab assistant matcher was 
completely inattentive during this task, actively not participating at points, and generally 
disengaged from participation. To standardize the behavior in each condition, a checklist of 
behaviors to complete was memorized by all lab assistant matchers. Disengaged behaviors 
include checking a cell phone, not making eye contact, looking around the room, and 
making a mistake on the map path. Table 1 presents differences in this scripted behavior in 
the two conditions. The overseeing experimenter had a clipboard and took copious 
(unnecessary) notes, to provide a plausible explanation for why they did not notice this 
behavior in the Disengaged condition. The task was completed when the participants 
notified the overseeing experimenter that the paths were completed, who then confirmed if 
the matchers’ paths matched the speaker’s. 
Fifteen pairs of participants were randomly assigned to the Engaged condition and 
fifteen pairs were randomly assigned to the Disengaged condition.  
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Table 1 
Participating lab assistant behaviors, by condition 
Engaged Disengaged 
Physical behaviors 
Sit up straight in chair Slouch 
Maintain eye contact with whoever is 
speaking 
Don’t make eye contact with anybody 
Look at the current talker Look at the table, instead of the talker 
Hands engaged in task, or quietly on 
table/lap 
Playing with hair/ picking at nail polish 
etc. 
Verbal behaviors 
Asking questions after speaker finishes 
talking 
Asks questions after multiple conversation 
turns 
Promptly confirms understanding when 
asked 
Is silent initially, answer is delayed when 
asked  
Social behaviors 
Doesn’t use distractions during task  Distracted during task (e.g., pulling phone 
out) 
Shows engagement in task only Glancing around room multiple times 
Neutral, small smile facial expression Bored, flat facial expression 
 
 
In the second phase of the task, the participants were seated at three separate 
computers in the same room that they had completed the Map Task in. The task in this 
phase was to learn the names of a series of 12 unfamiliar monster images. The monsters, 
which were presented on the computer displays, were a subset of the stimuli used in 
Gorman et al. (2013).  
The participant roles (speaker, matcher, lab assistant matcher) from the Map Task 
were maintained in the name learning task. All participants were instructed to learn the 
names of the novel monsters and were told that they would be tested on the names later. A 
round of name learning consisted of two stages: group name learning, and then individual 
name review.  
The speaker was seated at the end of one table, with the matchers on the other side 
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of the table. In the group name learning stage, the speaker rotated their laptop so that all 
three members of the group could see the screen. The setup of the group name learning 
stage is pictured in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. The setup for the group name learning (Where S is the speaker and M is a 
matcher). All participants could see the speaker’s screen, but the speaker could not see the 
screens of the matchers. 
 
 The matchers were able to see both their own individual laptops, as well as the 
director’s laptop screen. On each trial, the three participants viewed an image of a monster 
with the name written underneath it on the director’s laptop. The speaker was instructed to 
read out loud the name of that monster, to ensure the names were attended to and to 
increase the likelihood of the speaker remembering that monster’s name (cf. the generation 
effect; Slamecka & Graf, 1978, Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007).  On the 
matchers’ laptops, three unlabeled monsters were displayed: the target monster that 
matched the one on the speaker’s screen and two randomly selected distractor monsters. 
The matchers were instructed to click on the target monster on their individual laptops. 
After both matchers clicked, the speaker clicked their own laptop to move to the next trial. 
The 12 monsters were shown, one at a time, in a random order that was the same for all 
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groups, with each monster shown twice in a round. Thus the participants had two chances 
to learn each monster’s name.  
Unlike the first phase of the task, the behavior of the lab assistant matcher was held 
constant across conditions during group name learning. In both the Engaged and 
Disengaged conditions, the lab assistant matcher was instructed to participate without 
comment and not engage in overtly inattentive behaviors. Since the speaker could not see 
the matchers’ screens, it was left ambiguous as to whether the lab assistant matcher was 
truly selecting the correct monster, or just clicking at random.  
Following group name learning was a self-paced review of the names. All 
participants completed this individual self-paced review. Participants stayed in the same 
room, and the rotated laptop was turned back to face the speaker. During this review, the 
12 monsters were shown on the screen, one at a time, unlabeled, and in a different random 
order than during the group name learning, which was the same across all participants and 
groups. The participants were instructed to mentally rehearse the monster’s name, and then 
click the mouse. The monster then appeared labeled on the screen so that the participant 
was able to check if they correctly remembered the name. The silent and individual nature 
of this task was intended to keep ambiguous whether the lab assistant was truly learning 
the monster names, while also providing an opportunity for the true participants to assess 
which names they had learned effectively. The individual review phase is pictured in 
Figure 3. A round of the name-learning task consisted of the name learning stage (repeated 
twice) and one repetition of the self-paced review. The name-learning task lasted for eight 
repetitions of the group name learning and the self-paced review, thus all together 
participants were given 24 exposures to each monster name with 8 additional self-test 
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opportunities.  
 
Figure 3. The setup of the individual name review. Participants were self-paced, with no 
time limit per name. 
 
The third phase of the task was a referential communication task (Krauss & 
Weinheimer, 1966) in which the speaker gave the matchers (one at a time) instructions to 
re-arrange a series of pictures. It was during this phase of the task that we collected the data 
of primary interest for analysis. The speaker interacted with each matcher individually 
while the other matcher was in another room. The order in which the speaker interacted 
with the two matchers was counterbalanced across subjects. The speaker and the matcher 
used separate laptops and remained in the same room as the previous tasks. The speaker’s 
display had a set arrangement of 16 monsters (12 named, 4 novel) and the matcher’s 
display had the same monsters but in a randomized order. The novel monsters were 
included to increase the difficulty of the task. An example speaker’s display is seen in 
Figure 4. The speaker’s task was to give the matcher instructions for how to re-arrange the 
monsters so that the arrangement of the monsters on their screens matched. The matcher 
followed the speaker’s instructions by dragging the monsters around the screen with the 
mouse. The speaker was not given explicit instructions for how to refer to the monsters; if 
asked directly, the overseeing experimenter said that they were welcome to say whatever 
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they wanted. Matchers were told that they could ask questions if needed and could freely 
communicate with the speaker. Matchers mostly provided positive feedback when 
successfully positioning an item (e.g. mm-hm, okay), and rarely asked questions. When 
matchers did ask questions, it was typically to clarify the position of a monster (e.g., Wait 
that one was under bluchek?) or to seek confirmation (e.g., Pink one right?). The lab 
assistant matcher was instructed to fully engage in this task, regardless of condition. The 
task was completed when all the monsters were arranged correctly and checked by the 
overseeing experimenter.  
Once the speaker and the first matcher completed the referential communication 
task, the two matchers switched places and the speaker repeated the task with the second 
matcher. In this second round, the order of the pictures was changed and the novel 
monsters were swapped with a set of new novel monsters. It was during this phase in 
which the conversation was recorded for analysis. The audio was recorded using the 
microphone on the speaker’s Macbook laptop. Both the speaker and the matcher’s 
utterances were transcribed.  
Once both matchers participated in the task, all participants were given an 
individual post-test. Participants were handed a piece of paper with the twelve critical 
monsters pictured and unlabeled, and they had to correctly write down the names of all the 
monsters. Overall, the entire experiment took about forty minutes. 
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Figure 4. Example of a speaker’s display during the referential communication task. Novel 
monsters are boxed in gray. The corresponding matcher’s screen had the same 16 monsters 
randomly positioned. 
 
Predictions 
Success in the critical experimental task – the referential communication task – 
requires the speaker to provide enough details for the addressee to identify each intended 
referent; doing so requires the speaker to make assumptions about the addressee’s 
knowledge (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). This allows us to make specific predictions 
about the relationship between assumptions about common ground and referential form in 
this task. Based on previous studies of audience design with these stimuli (Gorman, et al., 
2013), we expect speakers to produce longer descriptions of the monsters if common 
ground for the names cannot be assumed. If addressee engagement has nonspecific effects 
on subsequent inferences about common ground, speakers should be less likely to assume 
common ground for the names of the monsters, and produce longer descriptions (include 
more information) for addressees who were previously disengaged. Such a result would 
obtain if speakers assumed that previously disengaged addressees were unlikely to have 
learned the names of the monsters, and required more descriptive information in order to 
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identify them. Alternatively, if addressee feedback has limited effects on assumptions 
about common ground (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015), or 
these effects are restricted to the specific information exchanged during the period of 
distraction, speakers should describe the monsters in a similar way for the disengaged and 
engaged matcher.  
2.2 Results 
 
Data Exclusions 
 Only the groups in which the speaker scored at or above 80% accuracy on the post-
test of the monster names were included in the analysis (5 groups of participants were 
excluded based on this criterion). This accuracy criterion was used to ensure that the 
speaker had the capability of naming the monster when appropriate. Mean accuracy on the 
post-test for the final group of 30 pairs of participants included in the analysis was 95.8%. 
Our analyses focus on utterances produced by the speaker, as our hypotheses 
concern how the attentiveness of a conversational partner influences the process of 
audience design. In particular, we focus our analyses on the length of the descriptions that 
speakers used to describe the monsters that they had learned the names for in the name-
learning phase. Novel referents were excluded from analysis because no differences 
between conditions were expected for them. Due to the nature of the picture-arranging 
task, it is possible for the matcher to place the final monster using a process of elimination 
(see Clark &Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). For example, sometimes the matcher will provide the 
name (and the last one is inta?) and the speaker just affirms (Yup good). Because of this, 
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the last referent discussed was excluded from analysis. Any trials where the speaker used 
an incorrect name were excluded, eliminating 1.6% of data.  
 
Analysis 
The primary dependent measure was the total number of words used by the speaker 
to describe each monster. For example, a description of danzo the blue monster with the 
yellow polka dots would have a length of 9.  If the speaker just used the name (e.g., The 
eighth character is nelky), this was counted as a description length of 1. Lexical 
disfluencies (e.g., “um”) were not included in the description length measure. 
To examine the effect of partner engagement on the length of speakers’ utterances, 
we used a mixed effect linear model, using the Poisson distribution due to the count nature 
of the data. The model was fit with the maximal random effects structure for subjects and 
items. When the maximal model did not converge, a backwards-fitting procedure was 
implemented to find the model with the largest random effects structure that successfully 
converged (Barr et al., 2013). Recall that in both the Engaged and the Disengaged 
conditions, speakers addressed two different Matchers. For speakers in the Engaged 
condition, both Matchers were engaged (the participant Matcher and the lab assistant); for 
speakers in the Disengaged condition, one Matcher was engaged (the participant Matcher) 
and one was disengaged (the lab assistant). Note that while we consider participant 
Matchers as “engaged” for the purposes of analysis, we did not explicitly manipulate their 
behavior (though they were generally engaged). The predictors used in the model were 
factors for Matcher Type (lab assistant matcher or true matcher) and Condition (Engaged 
or Disengaged) and Trial (first or second time the speaker completed the referential 
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communication task). This factor was included based on previous findings that repeated 
mention to a given item tends to result in shorter utterances (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; 
Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, submitted). All predictors were mean-centered. 
 Table 2 shows the results of the model. There was a significant main effect of Trial, 
such that speakers used shorter descriptions when describing the monsters with the second 
matcher (β = -0.40, p < .05). There was also a significant main effect of Condition: 
speakers used longer descriptions in the Disengaged condition compared to the Engaged 
condition, independent of who the speaker was currently addressing (β = 0.29, p < .05). 
There was no main effect of Matcher Type (participant or lab assistant) indicating that 
speakers produced similar length utterances for both types of addressees (β = 0.05, p > .6). 
The predicted interaction between Matcher Type and Condition was not significant (p > 
.7). Figure 5 shows the average description length for each matcher type in each condition. 
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Table 2 
Full mixed effects model for Experiment 1 
 Estimate  SE z-value   Var. Stand. 
Dev. 
Fixed     Random     
Trial -0.397 0.183 -2.167* Subject (Intercept) 0.116 0.341 
Matcher Type 0.045 0.112 0.406  Trial 0.299 0.547 
Condition 0.298  0.135 2.207* Item (Intercept) 0.182 0.426 
Trial : Matcher Type -0.081 0.270 -0.301  Trial 0.223 0.473 
Trial : Condition -0.107  0.225 -0.478     
Matcher Type : 
Condition 
-0.059  0.225 -0.262     
Trial : Matcher Type : 
Condition 
0.730  0.539 1.354     
Note: * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at p < .01, *** = significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 5. The average description length (in words) for the different types of matchers in 
the different conditions. In the Disengaged condition, the lab assistant matcher was 
disengaged from the task; in the Engaged condition, the lab assistant matcher participated 
in the task fully. The behavior of the participant Matcher was not experimentally 
manipulated. 
2.3 Discussion 
 
We hypothesized that the engagement of a conversational partner would influence 
the speaker’s assumptions about what information was in common ground with that 
partner. We predicted that if listener attentiveness has general effects on assumptions about 
common ground, speakers would label objects using more words when addressing the 
partner who had been previously disengaged during the map task. Speakers were in fact 
more descriptive overall in the Disengaged condition: however, they did not differentiate 
between the previously engaged and disengaged partners. Thus, there was no evidence that 
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speakers took into account an addressee’s previous level of engagement (during the map 
task) when making assumptions about that specific addressee’s knowledge in a subsequent 
task (during the name learning task). 
One explanation of these findings is that speakers assume what they say to another 
person is common ground with that person, regardless of the type of feedback that listener 
provides (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015). An alternative 
possibility – one we will explore in Experiment 2 – is that the (in)attentiveness of an 
addressee does influence inferences about what is and is not common ground, but that 
these inferences are specific to the information that was exchanged during period of 
inattention. By design, in the Disengaged condition, the disengaged matcher did not 
produce any overt behaviors to positively indicate a lack of engagement in the period of 
time following the map task. Speakers, then, may have assumed that this prior 
inattentiveness did not compromise the disengaged matcher’s ability to learn the monster 
names in the subsequent conversation. In Experiment 2 we test this hypothesis by 
manipulating addressee engagement during the name-learning task itself to test for specific 
effects of addressee engagement on inferences about what is and is not common ground.   
A final question concerns why speakers produced longer utterances overall when 
the lab assistant matcher had been disengaged. One explanation is that the experience of 
interacting with a disengaged matcher increased overall uncertainty in the situation. To be 
sure, however, the fact that speakers used similar expressions for disengaged and engaged 
matchers at test, is inconsistent with the hypothesis that inattention affected assumptions 
about common ground. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, but with some major modifications. 
First, because there were no differences in how speakers addressed the true participant and 
lab assistant participant, in Experiment 2 only lab assistants served as matchers. Second, 
the overseeing experimenter left the room during the tasks in order to increase the 
plausibility of the disengaged behavior not being acknowledged. Third, we dropped the 
Map Task and instead manipulated the lab assistant’s behavior during the name learning 
task. The critical referential communication task immediately followed the name-learning 
task, and we altered the referential communication task in order to allow both matchers to 
participate at the same time. Experiment 2 is designed to test for specific influences of 
addressee attention on assumptions about common ground; to do so we manipulated the lab 
assistant’s behavior during a task – the name learning task – that was relevant to the critical 
referential communication task. If speakers use a conversational partner’s (in)attention to 
assess common ground for what was said during that period of (in)attention, and this 
common ground (or lack thereof) guides subsequent audience design, then speakers should 
produce longer descriptions when addressing a partner who was previously disengaged, 
compared to a partner that was previously engaged. 
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3.1 Methods 
 
 
Participants  
33 native English speakers from the University of Illinois community served as 
participants for monetary compensation at a rate of $8 an hour. All participants were young 
adults aged 18 or older, and none had participated in Experiment 1. An additional 11 
participants were run and excluded from analysis for scoring below the accuracy threshold.  
  
Procedure 
 The participants completed the task in a group of three, however, unlike 
Experiment 1, the two other individuals in the group were lab assistants. The same cover 
story (that the participating lab assistants had never done the task before and are currently 
participating so as to be trained on the task in order to run other participants in the future) 
from Experiment 1 was used to explain the participation of lab assistants in the study. 
Experiment 2 consisted of two tasks: a group name-learning task and a referential 
communication task. The same monster stimuli from Experiment 1 were used in 
Experiment 2.  
During the group-name learning task, the three partners in the group were told to 
work together to learn the names of the different monsters, and that they would be tested 
on the names later. The true participant was always “randomly” assigned to the role of 
speaker, and the two lab assistants were assigned to be the matchers. After giving the three 
partners the task instructions, the overseeing experimenter left the room, citing concerns 
over space. One laptop was positioned such that all partners could see the screen and the 
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participant speaker could control the pace of the task. A schematic of the room layout is 
seen in Figure 6.  
During the group-name-learning task, the group first saw instructions were 
displayed on the laptop, saying that the group needed to learn the names of the different 
monsters together, and to click the mouse to move between trials. Then, there were 24 
trials in which the 12 monsters were presented one-at-a-time, labeled with their names; 
each monster was seen twice and trials were in a random order. Next, participants saw 
instructions to work together to generate the name, and to click to move on after everybody 
said the name out loud. After these instructions appeared on the laptop, then the monsters 
were presented unlabeled, one-at-a-time, in a random order six times each, resulting in a 
total of 72 of these name-review trials. They had to work together to produce the name; 
upon clicking, the monster appeared with its label, allowing the participants to assess the 
accuracy of their initial guess. All participants were encouraged to say the names out loud, 
and the two lab assistants had been previously instructed to act as if they had never seen 
the monsters before. It was during this part of the task that we manipulated one of the lab 
assistant’s behavior. In the Engaged condition, both lab assistants were fully attentive and 
participating, and in the Disengaged condition one assistant was engaged and the other was 
disengaged, implementing the relevant behaviors as described in Experiment 1. Altogether, 
participants were exposed to each monster-name pairing eight times before the test phase. 
 The final task was a referential communication task. Participants remained in the 
same room and in the same positions. As in Experiment 1, this task was the focus of our 
primary analyses and was audio-recorded. Each of the three partners was given a laptop by 
the overseeing experimenter, who then left the room again. The two matchers could see 
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each other’s screens, but the speaker could not see the matchers’ screens. On each trial, the 
three partners saw the same 4 monsters on their respective computers, and the participant 
speaker saw a box around one of the 4 monsters to indicate the target. A cue at the top of 
the speaker’s screen indicated who the addressee was for that trial, either “Matcher A” or 
“Matcher B”; which matcher was the addressee randomly alternated on each trial. The 
speaker’s task was to tell the indicated Matcher to click on the target picture; the other 
Matcher simply clicked to move forward to the next trial (see Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 
submitted, for a similar approach). Example displays are shown in Figures 7a-b. The 
individual laptops used by matchers had large “Matcher A” and “Matcher B” labels that 
were visible to the speaker. Speakers were allowed to describe the target in any way, with 
the exception of location information (e.g., top left), as the position of the monsters was 
randomized for each participant separately. Both Matchers, regardless of their previous 
engagement level, participated fully. During this phase of the task, the speaker identified 
each monster twice for each matcher (to increase the amount of data), resulting in 48 trials. 
There were no filler trials. Unlike Experiment 1, there were no new monsters visible at test; 
this was done to prevent descriptions of the named monsters by comparing them to the 
novel monsters. 
 The same post-test of generating the names for the monsters from Experiment 1 
was given to all participants after completion of the matching task for the same purpose of 
confirming participants had the capacity to use the names. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Engaged condition (n=17) or the 
Disengaged condition (n=16), each participant was assigned to one list. The pairings of 
names and monster illustrations was counterbalanced across 4 different lists. Overall, the 
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entire experiment took 30 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 6. A schematic of the room for the name learning task. 
 
 
(a)        (b)  
 
Figure 7. (a) Example speaker’s display for the matching task. (b) Example matcher’s 
display for the matching task. 
 
Predictions 
The manipulation of addressee engagement in Experiment 2 was during a phase of the 
conversation directly relevant to the critical referential communication task – whereas 
engaged matchers exhibited behavior consistent with learning the names of the monsters, 
disengaged matchers behaved as if they did not. If assessment of addressee knowledge for 
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the purposes of audience design is sensitive to addressee engagement, speakers should 
produce longer descriptions for addressees who were previously disengaged. Alternatively, 
if the behavior of the addressee has only limited effects on inferences about common 
ground (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015), speakers should 
produce similar descriptions for engaged and disengaged matchers.  
 
3.2 Results 
 
 
 
Data Exclusions 
 The same accuracy threshold from Experiment 1 of 80% performance on the post-
test for all speakers was used, resulting in exclusion of 11 participants. The accuracy of the 
remaining 33 participants was 93.2%. As in Experiment 1, only the speaker’s utterances 
were analyzed and trials where the speaker used the incorrect name at test were excluded, 
removing 0.1% of trials. 
Analysis 
The total word count was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1. Like 
Experiment 1, the word count data were analyzed in a mixed effect linear model, using the 
Poisson distribution. Recall that in both the Engaged and the Disengaged conditions, 
speakers addressed two different lab assistant Matchers; in the Engaged condition, both 
Matchers were engaged, whereas in the Disengaged condition, one Matcher was engaged 
and one was disengaged. To distinguish between the two lab assistant Matchers in our 
analyses, in the Disengaged condition, the disengaged Matcher was coded as the critical 
matcher and the engaged Matcher as the control matcher. In the Engaged condition, both 
the critical and control Matcher were engaged; for the purposes of analysis, the two 
 28  
Matchers were randomly assigned to the roles of critical and control. Thus, the predictor 
variables were Condition (Engaged vs. Disengaged), Matcher Type (Critical vs. Control), 
and Trial (whether it was the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th time that the speaker had described that 
specific monster). 
 Table 3 shows the full model output. There was a significant main effect of Trial, 
such that description length decreased with repeated descriptions (β = -0.14, p < .001). 
There was also a significant main effect of Matcher Type: speakers used longer 
descriptions when talking to a critical matcher compared to a control matcher (β = -0.54, p 
< .001). Condition was significant as well, with speakers using longer descriptions in the 
Disengaged condition compared to the Engaged condition (β = 0.59, p < .01). There was a 
significant interaction between Trial and Matcher Type, such that the reduction in 
description length with repeated reference was greater for critical than control Matchers (β 
= 0.09, p < .05). Critically, the interaction between Condition and Matcher Type was 
significant (β = -1.09, p < .001); as predicted, speakers used more words when addressing 
the critical matcher in the Disengaged condition compared to the critical matcher in the 
Engaged condition (p < .001), whereas speakers used a similar number of words when 
addressing control matchers in the Disengaged and Engaged conditions (p = .77). Figure 8 
shows the average description length for each matcher type in each condition, collapsed 
across the trial order variable (as our primary hypotheses do not concern changes over 
time). 
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Table 3 
Full mixed effects model for Experiment 2 
 Estimate  SE z-value   Var. Stand. 
Dev. 
Fixed     Random     
Trial -0.14 0.03 -4.94*** Subject (Intercept) 0.230 0.479 
Condition 0.59 0.18 3.25**  Trial 0.017 0.132 
Matcher Type -0.54 0.08 -6.82***  Matcher 
Type 
0.152 0.390 
Trial : Condition -0.06  0.06 -1.00  Trial : 
Matcher 
Type 
0.013 0.115 
Trial : Matcher Type 0.09  0.04 2.03* Item (Intercept) 0.042 0.426 
Condition : Matcher 
Type 
-1.09 0.16 -7.00***  Condition 0.046 0.214 
Trial : Condition : 
Matcher Type 
-0.04 0.08 -0.48     
Note: * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at p < .01, *** = significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 8. The mean description length for utterances in each condition, broken down by 
which matcher the utterance was addressed to (data are collapsed across trial). In the 
Disengaged condition, the critical matcher is the one who was disengaged during the name 
learning. In the Engaged condition, one matcher was randomly assigned to the role of 
critical matcher, and their behavior did not differ from the control matcher. Error bars 
indicate standard error. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
 
 
 
In Experiment 2, speakers learned names of monsters with either two fully engaged 
matchers, or one disengaged matcher and one engaged matcher, then, they completed a 
referential communication task in which they alternated between addressing the two 
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matchers. Consistent with our predictions, we found that speakers used longer descriptions 
when talking to previously disengaged matchers compared to previously engaged 
matchers. This finding suggests that speakers take into consideration partner attentiveness 
when assessing whether what has been said is or is not common ground with that partner; 
these representations of common ground in turn affect subsequent audience design for that 
particular partner. 
 Unlike Experiment 1, speakers designed these utterances in a partner specific 
manner: When one of the two lab assistants had previously been disengaged, speakers 
produced longer utterances for that previously disengaged matcher, but not for the other 
matcher. Why were speakers partner-specific in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1? 
The fact that the disengaged behavior in Experiment 1 happened during a task unrelated to 
the critical test likely played a key role. In Experiment 3, we directly test this interpretation 
of our findings by manipulating when during the interaction the disengaged behavior takes 
place.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to conceptually replicate Experiments 1-2 in a single 
experiment in order to test the hypothesis that addressee engagement has specific, rather 
than generic, effects on assumptions about what information is common ground. The 
design of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiment 2 but with the addition of an 
unrelated communicative game before the name learning task. In the disengaged condition, 
the critical manipulation was whether the lab assistant’s disengaged behavior occurred 
during the unrelated communicative game, or during the name learning task. We 
hypothesize that speakers are not only sensitive to the presence of disengaged behaviors 
when assessing a partner’s knowledge, but that the inferences about (the lack of) common 
ground due to that disengaged behavior are specific to the information exchanged during 
the period of inattention / lack of engagement. If this hypothesis is correct, speakers should 
design longer referring expressions for disengaged matchers, but only when that partner 
was disengaged during the name-learning task. However, if speakers are sensitive to 
disengaged behavior, but these effects are non-specific, speakers should not take into 
account the relevance of that behavior to the topic at hand, and should produce longer 
utterances at test when addressing the disengaged matcher, regardless of whether the 
disengaged behavior occurred during the irrelevant communication game or during the 
test-relevant name learning task.  
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4.1 Methods 
 
 
Participants  
46 native English speaking undergraduates at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign area served as participants for partial course credit. An additional 8 participants 
were run and excluded from analysis for scoring below the accuracy threshold.  
Procedure 
 Like Experiment 2, each participant took part in the task along with two laboratory 
assistants. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2, except for the addition of a 
communication game before the name learning phase.  
The communication game was similar to the “Heads Up” game: the three partners 
took turns holding up a card that showed the name of a historical, pop culture, or fictional 
person on it. The objective of the Heads Up game is for the person holding the card to 
guess the name on the card based on information provided by the other participants. The 
person holding the card was allowed to ask yes or no questions. The other participants were 
not allowed to say the name on the card, but all other responses were allowed. Participants 
played this game until they completed 33 trials (11 per participant) or for 15 minutes, 
whichever happened sooner.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions. In 
the Engaged condition (n=14), both matchers were engaged throughout the entire 
experiment. In the Disengaged-Game condition (n=16), the critical matcher was 
disengaged during the Heads Up game, but was engaged for all other tasks; in this 
condition the control matcher was engaged throughout the entire study. Finally, in the 
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Disengaged-Name condition (n=17), the critical matcher was disengaged during the name 
learning task, but was engaged for all other tasks; in this condition the control matcher was 
engaged throughout the study. The pairings of names and monster illustrations was 
counterbalanced across 4 different experimental lists; each participant was assigned to a 
single list. Overall, the whole task took forty minutes. 
Predictions 
If assessment of addressee knowledge is sensitive to addressee engagement during the 
specific circumstances during which the relevant information was communicated, speakers 
should produce long descriptions for the disengaged addressee in the Disengaged-Name 
condition, whereas short descriptions should be produced for the disengaged addressee in 
the Disengaged-Game condition, and for all engaged addressees. However, if addressee 
engagement has non-specific effects, speakers should assume a lack of common ground for 
the disengaged addressee, regardless of when the disengaged behavior occurred. If so, this 
predicts that the speaker should produce longer descriptions for disengaged than engaged 
matchers, in both the Disengaged-Name and Disengaged-Game conditions.  
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
 
Data Exclusions 
 The exclusion criteria were identical to Experiment 2, so only the speaker’s 
utterances were analyzed and trials where the speaker used the incorrect name at test were 
excluded, eliminating 2.4% of the trials. The average accuracy for the remaining 46 
participants was 97.9%. 
Analysis 
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The speakers’ descriptions of the monsters during the sorting task were coded for 
the number of words in the same way as in Experiments 1-2.  The data were analyzed in 
the same way as Experiment 2, using a mixed effect linear model with a Poisson 
distribution. The predictor variables in the model were Condition (Engaged, Disengaged-
Game, Disengaged-Name), Matcher Type (Critical vs. Control), and Trial (whether it was 
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th time that the speaker had described that specific monster). Condition 
was Helmert coded to first compare the Engaged condition to both Disengaged conditions, 
and then to compare the Disengaged-Game condition to the Disengaged-Name condition 
directly. As before, Matcher Type indexed the critical and control matchers. In the two 
Disengaged conditions, the critical matcher was the matcher who showed disengaged 
behavior, and the control matcher was the matcher who always showed engaged behavior. 
In the Engaged condition, one matcher was randomly assigned to each role (since both 
matchers were engaged in this condition).  
 Table 4 shows the full output of the model. There was a significant main effect of 
Trial, such that descriptions became shorter over time with repeated reference (β = -0.11, p 
< .001). A main effect of Matcher Type (β = 0.12, p < .01) was qualified by the predicted 
interaction between Condition and Matcher (β = -0.29, p < .001): Whereas speakers used 
more words when addressing the critical than the control matcher in the Disengaged-Name 
condition (p < .001), by contrast, in the Disengaged-Game condition there was no effect of 
matcher type (p = .65). Figure 9 shows the average description length for each matcher 
type in each condition, collapsed across trial (there were no specific hypotheses related to 
the trial variable). 
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Table 4 
Full mixed effects model for Experiment 3 
 Estimate  SE z-value   Var. Stand. 
Dev. 
Fixed     Random     
Trial -0.11 0.02 -4.39*** Subject (Intercept) 0.24 0.49 
Condition 1 (Engaged 
vs. Disengaged)  
0.021 0.16 0.90  Trial 0.02 0.13 
Condition 2 
(Disengaged-Game vs. 
Disengaged-Name)  
0.08 0.18 0.46 Item (Intercept) 0.02 0.14 
Matcher Type -0.09 0.03 -2.66**  Condition 1 0.01 0.11 
Trial : Condition 1 0.02 0.05 0.38  Condition 2  0.03 0.16 
Trial : Condition 2 0.06  0.06 1.11     
Condition 1 : Matcher 
Type 
-0.12 0.07 -1.61     
Condition 2 : Matcher 
Type 
-0.29 0.08 -3.63***     
Trial : Condition 1 : 
Matcher Type 
-0.03 0.07 -0.49     
Trial : Condition 2 : 
Matcher Type 
-0.08 0.07 -1.08     
Note: * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at p < .01, *** = significant at p < .001. 
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Figure 9. The mean description length for utterances in each condition, broken down by 
which matcher the utterance was addressed to, and collapsed across trial. In the 
Disengaged conditions, the critical matcher is the one who was disengaged (either during 
the name learning or the game). In the Engaged condition, one matcher was randomly 
assigned to the role of critical matcher, and their behavior did not differ from the control 
matcher. Error bars indicate standard error. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
Speakers in Experiment 3 produced longer descriptions for the disengaged matcher, 
but only in the Disengaged-Name condition, demonstrating that the inattention of a 
discourse partner has specific effects on a conversational partner’s inferences about what is 
and is not common ground. We note that the magnitude of the engagement effect is smaller 
in the Disengaged-Name condition of Experiment 3, compared to the effect observed in 
Experiment 2. While the name-learning and referential communication tasks were identical 
in Experiments 2 and 3, all participants in Experiment 3 additionally completed the Heads 
Up game prior to name learning. Thus we suspect that the smaller effect in Experiment 3 
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may owe to participant fatigue. That said, the findings in the Disengaged-Name condition 
of Experiment 3 conceptually replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 2, 
demonstrating the robustness of this effect.
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Three experiments examined the relationship between the engagement of a conversational 
partner and inferences about common ground. According to the classic view, 
conversational participants use simple heuristics to make inferences about what is and is 
not common ground; a speaker can assume common ground for what they have said when 
the (rational) listener is co-present and attentive (Clark & Marshall 1978; 1981). These 
representations of common ground, in turn, guide language use in conversational settings, 
with speakers providing longer referential descriptions when common ground cannot be 
assumed (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). Here, we tested 
the hypothesis that in conversation, speakers only assume common ground for what they 
have said when the co-present addressee is attentive in the conversation. 
The present findings support this hypothesis, and in addition, show that these 
effects of addressee attentiveness are specific to the information exchanged during the 
period of inattention. In Experiment 1, speakers who had interacted with a partner who was 
disengaged in a prior, irrelevant, task did not provide more details when addressing the 
disengaged partner than the engaged partner, suggesting that simply exhibiting inattention 
at some point in the conversation does not cause the speaker to assume that the addressee 
would fail to understand later communicated information.  
To test this interpretation of the data, in Experiment 2, the disengaged behavior 
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occurred in a prior task that was relevant to the critical referential communication task; 
consistent with our predictions, speakers used longer descriptions when talking to 
previously disengaged partners compared to previously engaged partners. Experiment 3 
directly tested the specificity hypothesis by manipulating when the disengaged behavior 
happened, and found that speakers were only more descriptive when talking to partners that 
were disengaged when they were learning the information that was relevant to success in 
the current task.  
 Viewed from the framework of least collaborative effort (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986) speakers only generate longer, more effortful descriptions when there is direct 
evidence that the added cost of producing a long description is necessary to achieve 
successful communication. When a partner was disengaged during a part of the 
conversation that was irrelevant to success in the referential communication task (the map 
task in Experiment 1; the Heads-Up game in the Disengaged-Game condition of 
Experiment 3), speakers produced similar descriptions for engaged and disengaged 
matchers, suggesting that both were assumed to have learned the names of the monsters. It 
was only when the partner exhibited a lack of attention during the relevant, name learning 
task (Experiment 2 and Disengaged-Name condition of Experiment 3) that speakers 
produced longer descriptions of the monsters for the disengaged matcher. Thus speakers 
appear to be sensitive to the fact that attention in a conversation is not static, and can 
fluctuate over time. Speakers use changes in a partner’s level of engagement to guide 
inferences about what parts of the current experience made it into the common ground, and 
what parts were missed. Unlike the flat-out denials that were necessary to prevent 
formation of common ground in previous work (Brown-Schmidt, 2009), the cues used in 
 41  
the present work were fairly subtle and mimic the kinds of disengagement often 
encountered in the real world. Furthermore, participants were given no advance warning 
about the behavior of their matchers, meaning these behaviors were salient enough to be 
observed without needing to draw attention to them. 
 The audience design effects in the Disengaged condition of Experiment 2 and the 
Disengaged-Name condition of Experiment 3 are noteworthy because success in these 
conditions required the speaker to randomly alternate, from trial to trial which matcher they 
were addressing. In prior studies of three-party conversation that involved a similar random 
alternation, speakers successfully produced long descriptions for a matcher who was 
completely naïve about the names of the referenced stimuli, and short descriptions for a 
matcher who was knowledgeable (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, submitted). The present study 
was more challenging, however, because both matchers were familiar with the monster 
stimuli -- all three partners participated in the name-learning session together. Such 
situations in which different partners are associated with similar experiences are known to 
pose challenges for audience design processes (Horton & Gerrig, 2005), making it all the 
more impressive that speakers were successful here. An open question is how the distinct 
interactive styles of the two matchers influence subsequent representations of the 
conversation. In their study of the role of listener inattentiveness on storytelling, Pasupathi, 
et al. (1998) brought speakers back to the lab after a 3-week delay to test story recall. They 
found that speakers who had told stories to inattentive listeners recalled less about those 
stories compared to speakers who addressed attentive listeners. Taken together with our 
own findings, the emerging picture is that the process of interacting with disengaged 
addressees may not only affect conversational processes in the moment (such as whether to 
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assume common ground, or whether to elaborate a referential description), but in addition, 
may affect a speaker’s memorial representation of that interaction well after the fact.  
 A final consideration is the specific locus of the inattention effect. Recall that in 
prior studies of the role of common ground in on-line language comprehension found that 
common ground was not assumed when a conversational partner had previously denied 
what had been said (Brown-Schmidt, 2009), but that varying degrees of feedback 
hypothesized to provide different amounts of evidence for common ground did not have 
substantively different effects on common ground (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt 
& Fraundorf, 2015). Yet other work shows that even minimal behaviors such as head nods 
(Matarazzo, et al., 1964), can influence what speakers say in conversation. Here we 
alternate between the terms (dis)engagement and (in)attention, and indeed our engaged and 
disengaged matchers differed in a host of physical, verbal and social behaviors that indicate 
the presence or absence of engagement and attention. This simultaneous manipulation of a 
large number of interactional variables was an intentional attempt to mimic the every-day 
experience of conversing with a partner who is attentive or one who is distracted (e.g., 
commonly these days, by a smartphone). Whether one, some, or all of these behaviors are 
necessary in order to elicit the observed effects of attention/engagement remains an open 
question for future work.    
 In conclusion, the process by which conversational partners form common ground 
for what they have been discussing takes into account information about jointly 
experienced events and the partner’s attention to those events. While simultaneously 
attending to a given physical or linguistic event cannot guarantee mutual knowledge for 
that event, speakers use the heuristic of simultaneity of attention to infer what is common 
 43  
ground with the listener. To return to an earlier example, if your friend pulls out her phone 
in the middle of your conversation, you are likely to assume that she missed what you were 
saying at that point in time alone. Our findings offer clear support for Clark and Marshall’s 
(1978; 1981) proposal that the simultaneity of attention supports assumptions about 
common ground, and further, show that inferences regarding the attentiveness of a 
conversational partner are specific to information that is relevant to what was (or was not) 
attended to in the conversation.  
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